Why did Google win?
No, you haven't missed any awards ceremonies, and yes,
there are still a few other search engine companies in business.
But consider this: if you've looked at yours or anyone else's
server logs lately, you'll see that Google wins in a landslide
over all other search referrers. Google is a huge search
referrer now.
A typical webmaster's log file might show the following
referrer info:
- Google.com: a lot.
-
Google.Yahoo.com: about 20% of the number of Google.com
referrals.
-
AltaVista: a little
-
Yahoo: a little
-
Everything else including MSN and AOL: fuhgeddabout it,
unless you pay heavily for inclusion or clicks.
When it comes to what webmasters used to think of as "search
engine referrals" - unpaid referrals from a keyword-based
spider engine (or even paid referrals - unless you spend
heavily, Inktomi won't drive much traffic to your site)
- the situation is basically one of total Google dominance.
Which must mean that they are rapidly approaching dominance
as the engine of choice for mainstream users.
How did this happen? And is the trend likely to reverse
itself anytime soon?
Industry observers offer a variety of explanations for
Google's runaway popularity with consumers. They break down
as follows.
Timing
Seth Godin, a leading authority on permission marketing
and buzz building, puts timing at the top of his list of
reasons for Google's success. Being a later mover meant
that this was the "third wave" or the "new,
improved version," argues Godin. "The first wave
was the big guys. The second wave (Ask Jeeves, etc.) got
swamped in the noise of the first wave. We were ready for
version 3."
Andy Feit, Executive VP of Sales and Marketing for Quiver,
an enterprise taxonomy software company, points out that
Google got into the game at the tail end of the venture
capital boom and thus was able to operate as a well-funded
private company with some insulation from immediate market
demands. "In an era when the venture community was
more concerned with page views and unique visitors instead
of profitabilty," says Feit, "Google did not need
to compete on the same terms as the people they were up
against. They could afford to price at a level that lost
money on every query. They could afford to forgo the advertising
revenue in lieu of a cleaner, faster page."
Godin adds that "the Yahoo deal [to replace Inktomi
as Yahoo's spider engine] gave them credibility at just
the right moment."
The cognoscenti loved it
A well known principle of buzz as explained by Emanuel Rosen,
author of The Anatomy of Buzz, is the degree to which influential
"network hubs" take to a new product, book, movie,
etc. The cognoscenti can be wrong, of course. While the
Palm Pilot successfully made the transition out of the hands
of early adopters into a mainstream market, other grand
ideas that were embraced by industry publications and commentators,
such as pen-based computing, flopped. But in many cases,
word of mouth travels best when trusted authorities (what
Godin calls "sneezers" in his colorful Unleashing
The Ideavirus) truly embrace a new product. For whatever
reason, Google seemed hipper than the available options,
and many of us noticed small but gratifying things they
were implementing on their site.
Clean navigation and singular focus
Many have pointed to Google's clean interface as an important
part of what resonated with users. Steve Thomas, CEO of
Wherewithal, a provider of enterprise search technology,
argues that "it's not so much that Google made their
product simple, but rather that they actually marketed SEARCH.
When's the last time you heard of Yahoo or Excite spending
money to convince people that their search results were
better? They seem to have completely abandoned the idea."
AltaVista tried the same tactic, aping Google with its
Raging Search product in the summer of 2000. AltaVista corporate
strategists decided to return to the company's roots and
once again court the "search enthusiast market"
- but it was too little, too late. And the site which was
supposed to be pure search was, after all, an additional
site, which sent mixed signals to consumers. After Raging
Search was abandoned, the AltaVista site was once again
the only AltaVista site, and following the abandonment of
AltaVista's portal ambitions, it is laser-focused on search.
But at this stage, it's even later in the game, and most
know that AltaVista sees its future as a provider of corporate
search software, making consumers even less willing to embrace
a site they assume is being abandoned.
The flipside, then, is that the portal wars left the search
field wide open for a focused newcomer. AltaVista's failed
portal ambitions are well documented, but the broad focus
of Yahoo, Excite, and others made them forget their search
roots as well, which led them "to ignore their users,
and their site logs," says Thomas, who was a senior
Netscape engineer before co-founding Wherewithal. "At
Netscape, the #1 most hit page besides Home was Search -
by a factor of about 10x over the next most hit," he
adds. "To this day people still call Yahoo a search
engine even though they prefer the term portal. To most
users, that's what Yahoo is."
Godin, who has recently produced an e-book on consumer-friendly
site design, The Big Red Fez, sums this up succinctly: "They
had a banana and they didn't hide it." Godin compares
web surfers to the monkeys in scientific experiments who
need to go through certain steps to get a banana. If it
isn't clear where the banana is (the site's main benefit),
the monkey (consumers) won't bother to go looking for it.
Google, obviously, served up search and nothing but search
at a time when everyone else forgot this basic don't-hide-the-banana
principle.
Tara Calishain, publisher of an Internet site and newsletter
for research professionals called ResearchBuzz, points to
the fact that Google's relevance and unique ranking methods
were openly available for the average surfer or research
pro to try out, because Google ran its own search site.
In what seemed like a good idea at the time, Google's main
spider-based competition, Inktomi, adopted a strategy to
power search engines for other companies such as Yahoo (which
later dropped Inktomi for Google) and MSN.
This might have put Inktomi too much at the mercy of its
partners, though it has tried to repatriate some of its
control over revenue streams recently with the inception
of a paid inclusion model. "With Inktomi I think it
was the fact that early on they worked on licensing their
tech out to other people, and didn't do a lot to push the
Inktomi site itself. A lot of people lost interest in them
- including me - because you couldn't tell what they were
up to. They were kind of just out there," says Calishain.
Inktomi seemed to let the initial advantage of impressive
press clippings, particularly the scientific cachet surrounding
Inktomi's co-founder and first CEO Paul Gauthier, slip away
from them. They ceased to be in users' faces, so there was
no easy way for analysts or consumers to develop an affection
for Inktomi.
Detlev Johnson, moderator of i-search, a newsletter for
search engine optimization professionals and online marketers
seeking search engine submission tips, recently echoed this
sentiment in the August 16 edition of the newsletter. Johnson
writes:
"Google deserves praise for their relevancy if, for
nothing else, they woke journalists up to behold the power
of relevant Web search. Until now, no one has been able
to view Inktomi unfettered by Looksmart, DirectHit or ODP.
That's a difficult PR situation for Inktomi. Google should
feel lucky that they can compete without Inktomi in the
mix for search audience mind-share where journalists hang
out.
"How can online journalists praise something they
can't use or see clearly?"
The foundation of buzz: the product
itself
Word-of-mouth does not spread if the product doesn't truly
impress people. "Google is a great little hack,"
smiles Steve Thomas. "This allowed Google to win almost
every single pure search engine review, making them the
only option for anybody that ever read such a review. More
than their algorithm was the fact that they took the lead
in pages covered. It's hard to argue with 'more' when it
comes to a crawler search."
Andy Feit agrees that "first and foremost it came
down to Google having a great product. For about a year,
Google had a clear relevance advantage over everyone else,
and at the same time had a very large index and good performance.
At this point, the relevance advantage is no longer a differentiator
(I could argue some have even out-Googled Google), but that
hardly matters -people still think of them as having the
best relevance."
The name
"Google" is just one of those awesome naming coups
that comes along every so often. Imagine how far they might
have gotten with a clunky name like ArraySearch or HottFind.
Or, um, Raging Search.
At this point, all we can do is sit back and observe what
Google does with its big lead. It's like an amateur champ
(or Tiger Woods?) taking a six-shot lead going into the
final round at The Masters. There are hundreds of smart
players that can beat you on any given day, snapping at
your heels. And the magic can slip away without explanation. |